Firm Size and the Choice of Export Mode by Jennifer Abel-Koch
 
 
Gutenberg School of Management and Economics 
Discussion Paper Series 
 
 









Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz 



























Dr. Jennifer Abel-Koch 
Assistant Professor of Economics 







All discussion papers can be downloaded from http://wiwi.uni-mainz.de/DP Firm Size and the Choice of Export Mode
Jennifer Abel-Kochy
First draft: April 2010
This version: March 2011
Abstract
In international trade models, it is typically assumed that manufacturers ship their
goods directly to their foreign customers. In reality, however, many manufacturers
call in trade intermediaries to perform this task for them. Which manufacturers
make use of this option? Theory suggests that it is mostly the small rms which are
not protable enough to cover the high xed costs of building an own distribution
network abroad. Large and ecient rms, on the contrary, prefer to export their
goods directly. The present paper brings this hypothesis to a test. Using survey
data from the World Bank Enterprise Survey conducted in Turkey in 2008, it shows
that there is indeed a negative correlation between rm size and the relative im-
portance of intermediated exports. This result is highly robust to the inclusion of a
variety of controls, dierent estimation methods, and dierent measures of rm size.
Keywords: Heterogeneous rms, intermediated trade
JEL Classication: F12, F14
I am grateful to Pol Antr as, Lisandra Flach, Christina Gathmann, Eckhard Janeba, Volker Nocke,
Benjamin Protte, Bj orn Sa and Klaus W alde for fruitful discussions and helpful comments. I would
also like to thank seminar participants at the University of Mainz and at the 2010 Annual Meeting of
the European Trade Study Group. All errors are mine. This paper is a revised and extended version of
the CDSE Discussion Paper No. 91.
yGutenberg School of Management and Economics, University of Mainz, Jakob-Welder-Weg 4, 55128
Mainz, Germany. E-Mail: abelkoch@uni-mainz.de, phone: 0049-6131-39-22114, fax: 0049-6131-39-20385.1 Introduction
In international trade theory, it is typically assumed that manufacturing rms which want
to serve the foreign market ship their products directly to their nal consumers. What
we observe in reality, however, is that very often trade intermediaries are involved in the
exchange of goods and services across borders. Intermediaries are \... economic agents
that purchase from suppliers for resale to buyers or that help buyers and sellers to meet
and transact" (Spulber, 1996). If buyers and sellers are based in dierent countries, these
agents are trade intermediaries. They include wholesalers and retailers in the exporting
and importing country as well as large trading companies. In the 1990s, for instance,
Japanese trading companies exported over 40% and imported over 70% of the country's
products (Jones, 1998), and Hong Kong intermediated over 50% of the volume of China's
exports to the rest of the world (Feenstra and Hanson, 2004). Survey evidence suggests
that in 2003 in Germany, 47% of all rms with foreign customers exported directly, while
44% sold their goods abroad indirectly via a trade intermediary (Fryges, 2007).
Only recently, researchers have started to explore why rms may prefer using a trade
intermediary to exporting their goods directly. Not surprisingly, the choice of export mode
depends on destination country characteristics, such as the size of the foreign market
(Schr oder et al., 2005), the risk of expropriation and the enforceability of international
contracts, or the cultural distance to the target country (Felbermayr and Jung, 2011).
However, another important insight that emerges from new theoretical contributions
on the choice of export mode is that all else equal, smaller rms prefer to export their
products via trade intermediaries, while larger rms prefer to sell their goods abroad
directly. Ahn et al. (2011) introduce an intermediation technology in an otherwise stan-
dard heterogeneous rm model of international trade. As in the seminal model of Melitz
(2003), rms can ship their goods directly if they incur a xed cost of exporting. Alter-
natively, rms can export their products via a trade intermediary. This involves lower
xed costs, but as the trade intermediary incurs an additional per unit cost to handle the
goods, it also implies lower export revenues. In the presence of such an intermediation
technology, rms sort into export modes according to their sizes. The smallest rms do
not export at all and sell to the domestic market only. Larger rms export indirectly via
a trade intermediary, and the largest rms export directly to the nal consumers.
A similar approach is taken by Felbermayr and Jung (2011). In their model, lower
revenues from indirect as opposed to direct exports result from imperfectly enforceable
contracts between exporters and trade intermediaries. Due to this distortion, larger
exporters prefer to incur the higher xed costs of building their own distribution network
and export their goods directly. For smaller exporters trading via an intermediary is
1nevertheless attractive, as it helps them to save on the xed costs of exporting. Akerman
(2010) derives the same sorting pattern of rms by introducing wholesalers who are able
to spread the xed costs of exporting across more than one good, but have to charge an
additional markup on the procurement price of the rm to cover these xed costs.1
Blum et al. (2010) consider a search and matching model in which both exporters
and nal consumers expend resources to nd and match with an appropriate trading
partner. An exporter can match with a nal consumer in the foreign country either
directly or indirectly by matching with a trade intermediary who then matches with a
nal consumer. If the exporter is large, it is highly visible and easy to identify by nal
consumers in the foreign country. In this case, matching directly is ecient. On the
contrary, if the exporter is rather small, it is less likely to be found by potential foreign
customers and would have to spend considerable resources to match directly with a nal
consumer. Therefore, the smaller exporter better matches with a large trade intermediary
who then matches with a nal consumer. A large trade intermediary makes matching
cheaper, not only because it is easier to identify by both exporters and foreign customers,
but also because it pools the costs of matching and spreads them over many exporters
and nal consumers.2
Although the theoretical literature provides clear results on the relationship between
rm size and the choice of export mode, to date there is little evidence whether these
results are also empirically valid. Knowing which manufacturers make use of trade inter-
mediaries is however important to design eective export promotion policies, to evaluate
the impact of protectionist measures, or to analyze the eect of regulatory reform in the
intermediary sector on aggregate welfare and trade volumes, for instance. The present
papers lls this gap and uses data from the World Bank Enterprise Survey conducted in
Turkey in 2008 to evaluate whether smaller rms do indeed rely more heavily on trade
intermediaries. In addition to information about a variety of rm characteristics, the sur-
vey provides information about the share of revenues generated by selling domestically,
by exporting directly, and by exporting indirectly via a trade intermediary. It covers
a comparatively large representative sample of Turkish rms in terms of rm size, and
includes both exporters and non-exporters from a broad range of manufacturing sectors.
An indisputable drawback of the data is that it does not contain any information on
the destination of a rm's exports. However, I will argue that if the number and the
identity of a rm's export markets depend on the rm's size, there is still a clear pre-
1Keller et al. (2011) provide empirical evidence which supports the idea that trade intermediaries
reduce the xed costs of gaining access to foreign markets.
2A similar argument has been made by Rauch and Watson (2002), who show that trade intermediaries
can draw on strong networks and thereby facilitate matches between domestic sellers and foreign buyers.
The relevance of formal and informal networks for shaping bilateral trade relations has been emphasized
among others by Rauch (1999), Rauch and Trindade (2002) and Combes et al. (2005).
2diction regarding the relationship between rm size and the share of indirect exports in
total exports. A small rm will start exporting indirectly to a foreign market which is
easily accessible. A large rm will deliver to the same market rather directly. Even if it
uses a trade intermediary to enter into additional foreign markets, which are most likely
less accessible, the share of indirect exports in total exports will be lower as it is for a
small rm. In other words, if I do not control for the number of destination countries
served, I would underestimate the negative relationship between rm size and the relative
prevalence of intermediated exports. In that sense, my estimates are very conservative
indicators of the negative relationship between rm size and the share of indirect exports
in total exports to a given foreign market.
In fact, the empirical analysis indicates that the share of indirect exports in total
exports declines signicantly with rm size, and this result is robust to the inclusion
of a variety of control variables, dierent estimation methods and dierent measures of
rm size. In particular, adding proxies for rm age, management experience, ownership
structure, legal status or research and development activities has no eect on the sign or
signicance of the estimated coecient of rm size. Going beyond ordinary least squares
regressions and applying a non-linear quasi-maximum likelihood estimator developed for
fractional dependent variables does not change the main conclusions either, nor does
it matter whether sales or employees are used as a measure of rm size. A potential
concern in interpreting the estimated coecients as the causal eect of rm size on the
choice of export mode is reverse causality. It may well be conceivable that rms have
less employees simply because they opted for indirect exports and hence do not need a
foreign sales department. To alleviate the problem of reverse causality, I use lagged rm
size as an alternative explanatory variable. The coecient on rm size is only slightly
smaller in absolute terms and remains negative and highly signicant, suggesting that
causality does indeed run from rm size to the choice of export mode.
I further nd that rms which are part of a larger company export a larger fraction
of their goods indirectly, which is in line with the idea that these rms trade relatively
more intermediate inputs and unnished goods with each other, and export relatively
less nal goods which are potentially shipped directly to the nal consumer. Having a
highly skilled workforce and developing new and innovative products is generally asso-
ciated with relatively less indirect exports, which is consistent with the argument that
technically more sophisticated products require more direct contact to the customers,
and that innovative rms prefer a higher level of control.
The most closely related empirical studies in the growing literature on the role of
intermediaries in international trade are Felbermayr and Jung (2011), Ahn et al. (2011),
Fryges (2007), and Hessels and Terjesen (2010). Using census data on exports of U.S.
3rms, Felbermayr and Jung (2011) relate the relative prevalence of trade intermediaries
to destination country characteristics as well as to the dispersion of rm size across
industries. They nd that industries with a higher size dispersion exhibit a signicantly
lower relative prevalence of trade intermediaries, a result that is consistent with their
prediction regarding the sorting pattern of rms into dierent export modes. Yet, they
do not provide direct evidence at the rm level regarding the relationship between rm
size and the choice of export mode.
Ahn et al. (2011) also focus on the correlation between aggregate shares of interme-
diated exports and destination country characteristics. They use Chinese customs data
which allows them to classify exporters into manufacturing rms and trade intermedi-
aries. One of their observations is that trade intermediaries export higher unit values,
which is in line with the idea that intermediaries charge additional markups and export
more expensive goods produced by less ecient rms. As the customs authorities have
no information about the clients of the trade intermediaries, however, Ahn et al. (2011)
cannot use the data to test the prediction regarding the relationship between rm size
and the choice of export mode directly. Only in a recent revision, Ahn et al. (2011)
provide more direct evidence on the sorting pattern of Chinese rms, also drawing on
data from the World Bank Enterprise Survey. Their ndings are largely consistent with
my ndings for Turkish rms, showing an inverted U-shaped relationship between rm
size and the fraction of indirect exports in total sales for a sample of both exporters
and purely domestic rms. Yet, they do not control for rm characteristics other than
industry aliation, which may bias their results. This is particularly true as export sales
and domestic sales, which both enter their dependent variable, are likely to be aected
by dierent rm characteristics. My work diers from theirs not only in adding impor-
tant control variables, but also in addressing the issue of causality and in checking the
robustness of the results.3
Analyzing survey data of German and British rms, Fryges (2007) identies the factors
that drive rms to switch between dierent export modes. Controlling for destination
country characteristics, he nds that rm size has a signicantly positive eect on the
probability to change from indirect exports to direct exports, and interprets his result
as evidence for the claim that larger exporters are more likely to dispose of sucient
resources to establish their own distribution network abroad. But his sample is rather
small and covers only young rms in high-tech industries. Hessels and Terjesen (2010) also
3Two other recent studies which use data from the World Bank Enterprise Survey to analyze the export
behavior of manufacturers are McCann (2010) and Lu et al. (2010). These studies do not address the
issue of causality either. Moreover, both studies pool data from dierent countries, which is problematic
for reasons explained in footnote 8. Neither the revision of Ahn et al. (2011) nor the studies by McCann
(2010) and Lu et al. (2010) were available before the rst version of the present paper appeared as CDSE
Discussion Paper.
4provide evidence on the determinants of the choice of export mode at the rm level. For a
sample of small and medium sized enterprises in the Netherlands, they nd no signicant
eect of rm size on the probability to export indirectly as opposed to directly, which is
presumably due to their very small sample which basically excludes the largest rms in
the economy.
In the following section, I sketch a very simple and highly stylized model on the rela-
tionship between rm size and the choice of export mode to capture the main arguments
from the literature and to clarify the basic idea. In section 3, I derive some testable
hypotheses on the relationship between rm size and the choice of a trade intermediary.
I brie
y describe the data in section 4 before I show the results of the empirical analysis
in section 5. In section 6, I address the robustness of the results, before I summarize and
conclude in section 7.
2 A simple model
There are two symmetric countries each of which is populated by a mass L of consumers










with  > 1. The assumption of symmetry is not crucial for the results and can easily
be relaxed. Each consumer inelastically supplies one unit of labor, and the wage rate is












1  is the ideal price index
over all consumed varieties.
The dierentiated good is produced with increasing returns to scale under mono-
polistic competition, which implies that each variety will be produced by at most one
rm, and no rm will produce more than one variety. To produce one unit of variety i
for its domestic market, rm i requires ai units of labor. Firms dier in their marginal
costs ai. As in Melitz (2003), they can learn about their marginal costs only after they
have made a xed investment of fE units of labor, which is thereafter sunk. In addition
to the variable costs of production, there are xed distribution costs of f units of labor,
which re
ect the resources needed to build a distribution network, to maintain customer
relations or to meet specic product standards.
5If a rms wants to sell its variety abroad, it has the choice between two dierent export
modes. It can either ship its products directly to the nal consumers. In this case, the
rm has to incur iceberg trade costs D > 1, which re
ect transport costs, import taris
and other variable costs related to shipping the product abroad. In addition, the rm has
to pay xed distribution costs of fD units of labor. Alternatively, the rm can use a trade
intermediary. Exporting indirectly via a third party causes iceberg trade costs I > 1 and
xed distribution costs of fI units of labor. Using both export modes simultaneously to
ship goods to a given destination country is never optimal, as this creates unnecessarily
high xed costs.
It is assumed that the variable trade costs of exporting indirectly are higher than the
variable trade costs of exporting directly, I > D. One interpretation is that the higher
variable costs of exporting indirectly re
ect an additional markup charged by the trade
intermediary (Ahn et al., 2011). Another reason might be that the contract between
the rm and the trade intermediary is not enforceable, and hence the trade intermediary
has an incentive to hold up the manufacturer, which leads to lower export revenues
(Felbermayr and Jung, 2011).4
Further, the xed distribution costs associated with indirect exporting are assumed
to be lower than the xed costs of exporting directly, fI < fD. Intuitively, trade inter-
mediaries can spread the xed costs of building and maintaining a distribution network
across many manufacturers and thus lower them for each individual rm (Schr oder et al.,
2005). In addition, a trade intermediary is more familiar with the target market and
draws on strong networks, making access to this market cheaper (Felbermayr and Jung,
2011). Finally, for a manufacturing rm searching for a trade intermediary is most likely
not as costly as searching for many new customers abroad (Ahn et al., 2011; Blum et al.,
2010). In any case, getting access to a distribution network is more expensive abroad
than at home, f < fI < fD.
The prot maximizing consumer price for variety i is pH
i = 
 1ai on the domestic
market. On the foreign market, it is pI
i = 
 1Iai if the good is exported indirectly and
pD
i = 
 1Dai if the good is exported directly. Multiplying prices with the respective
4Strictly speaking, higher iceberg trade costs lead to higher marginal costs for the manufacturer,
while both the additional markup charged by the trade intermediary and the hold up problem due to
incomplete contract enforcement would lead to higher consumer prices, but not to higher marginal costs
for the manufacturer. Yet, the eect of higher iceberg trade costs on the revenues and prots of the
manufacturer is qualitatively the same as the eect of higher consumer prices. See also the discussion in
Felbermayr and Jung (2011) on this point.
6quantities and simplifying notation gives the following expressions for the potential sales
rm i can make on the domestic and foreign market,
s
H
i = A 'i (3)
s
I





i = A 
1 
D 'i (5)





1  captures market conditions such as the size of the population
and the aggregate price level, which is determined endogenously, and 'i = a
1 
i is a
measure of rm productivity. The potential prots rm i can generate at home or abroad,






















D 'i   fD: (8)
Firm i will be active on the domestic market only if H
i  0. It will export indirectly
if I
i  0 and I
i > D
i , and export directly if D
i  I
i. As marginal costs are constant,
the decision to be active on the home market and the decision to export are independent
of each other. This denes the following productivity cuto values for selling on the






















with 'H < 'I < 'D, under the assumption that the dierence in xed export costs
is suciently large to make indirect exporting attractive for small exporters, fD=fI >
(I=D)
 1. The least productive rms with 'i < 'H are not able to cover the xed
distribution costs and exit the market. All rms with 'H  'i < 'I sell their products on
the domestic market only, while all rms with 'I  'i < 'D also serve the foreign market
via indirect exports. The most productive rms with 'i  'D choose to deliver their
products directly to their foreign consumers. The productivity cuto values, together
with the distribution of marginal costs or rm productivities, respectively, determine the
aggregate price level.
73 Hypotheses on the choice of export mode
The sorting pattern of rms into purely domestic sellers, indirect exporters and direct










1 if 'I  'i < 'D
0 if 'D  'i
(12)
In a world with a variety of destination countries with dierent characteristics, such as
population size, the aggregate price level or the extent of the xed and variable trade
costs, a strict partitioning into only indirect and only direct exporters will of course not
be observed, as the respective productivity cuto values for dierent destination countries
will overlap. However, I would expect a negative relationship between the share of indirect
exports in total exports and rm productivity to persist. Highly productive rms may
serve additional countries which are not protable enough for inecient rms,5 and they
may even use a trade intermediary if these countries are hardly accessible. Yet, as highly
productive rms will also ship their goods directly to markets that inecient rms can
access only via a trade intermediary, their share of indirect exports in total exports will
most likely be lower.
Ideally, I would like to test the relationship between indirect exports and rm produc-
tivity directly. However, rm productivity is unobserved and has to be estimated from
the data. This is inherently problematic and estimates of rm productivity are most
likely inconsistent due to simultaneity problems. There are methods to deal with such
problems, but they generally require a panel dimension that the survey data I use in this
paper is lacking.6 Therefore, I will use rm size as measured by employment as a proxy
for rm productivity instead. Employment is observable, and it is positively correlated
with rm productivity. To see this, note that the labor used by a rm with productivity






















'i + f + fD if 'D  'i
(13)
5A positive relationship between rm productivity or rm size and the number of export destinations
is documented by Bernard et al. (2009) and Eaton et al. (2008), for instance.
6Usually, rm productivity is interpreted as the residual that results from tting a specic production
function. A simultaneity problem arises because a rm may observe its productivity and change its factor
inputs. Panel data methods to deal with this issue have been suggested by Olley and Pakes (1996) and
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), who use lagged investment or intermediate inputs as proxies, respectively.
8which is a strictly increasing function of rm productivity 'i under the assumptions made
on the xed and variable trade costs.7
There is also strong empirical evidence for the positive relationship between rm size as
measured by employment and rm productivity that arises in heterogeneous rm models
of international trade. Ark and Monnikhof (1996) show this relationship for France,
Germany, Japan, the United States and the United Kingdom. Leung et al. (2008) and
Baldwin et al. (2002) add evidence on the positive relationship between employment and
productivity for Canada, and Biesebroeck (2005) documents it for a variety of African
countries. Snodgrass and Biggs (1995) also nd a large productivity gap between the
largest and the smallest manufacturing rms in Turkey.
I am now ready to formulate the main hypothesis on the relationship between rm
size and the choice of export mode as re
ected by the share of indirect exports in total
exports.
Hypothesis 1 There is a negative relationship between rm size and the share of indirect
export sales in total export sales.
Apart from size, other rm characteristics are likely to in
uence the choice of export
mode. The age of the rm may play a role, as hypothesized by the international business
literature (e.g. Bilkey and Tesar, 1977 or Bilkey, 1978). Young rms start out as purely
domestic rms, and once they are established on the national market, they start to
export indirectly. After having made rst experiences in the foreign market, they begin
to export also directly. Similarly, Keller et al. (2011) argue that there may be cumulative
learning eects which reduce the xed cost of exporting directly as opposed to trading
via an intermediary. Thus, I expect a negative impact of rm age on the share of indirect
exports in total exports. Further, Anderson and Gatignon (1986) argue that rms which
invest in new technologies and oer innovative and sophisticated products prefer a higher
level of control over their foreign activities and therefore rather choose the direct export
mode. If they would use a trade intermediary, which has to be trained and equipped with
the technological knowhow that is necessary to sell the product, they would risk losing
their competitive advantage. From this I hypothesize that a higher degree of innovation
is associated with a lower share of indirect exports in total exports. And nally, as the
enforceability of international contracts improves, the hold-up problem associated with
using a trade intermediary becomes less severe, making indirect exports more attractive
(Felbermayr and Jung, 2011). Thus, there is most likely a positive relationship between
the level of contract enforceability and the share of indirect exports in total exports.
7Two alternative measures of rm size are total sales or export sales. These are also strictly increasing
in the productivity of the exporting rm.
94 Data and descriptive statistics
This study uses data from the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey
carried out by the World Bank in cooperation with the European Bank for Reconstruction
and Development in Turkey in 2008.8 All data is freely accessible to researchers9 and
comprises rich information on stratied random samples of rms with dierent sizes from
dierent sectors and geographic regions. As manufacturing rms are the focus of the
theoretical literature on rm size and intermediated trade, I exclude those rms from the
Turkish sample that are in the service, telecommunication or construction sector. This
leaves me with 704 rms for which I have observations on the main variables of interest.10
To give a rst impression on the relationship between rm size and the relative impor-
tance of dierent export modes, table 1 assigns the 704 rms to dierent size categories
according to the number of full-time employees and indicates the percentage of rms
within each size category which do not export at all and serve only the domestic market,
which export exclusively via trade intermediaries, which use both the indirect and the
direct export channel, and which ship their goods only directly.
Table 1: Export status and rm size
Firm size measured by employees
Export status < 20 20   99  100 Total
No exports 67% 40% 17% 40%
Indirect exports only 11% 12% 12% 12%
Indirect and direct exports 8% 17% 25% 17%
Direct exports only 14% 31% 45% 31%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100%
Number of rms 189 295 220 704
About 40% of the 704 manufacturers sell all their goods nationally and do not export
at all. Approximately 12% of all rms in the sample export only via trade intermediaries,
while 17% export both indirectly and directly, and 31% export only directly. The share
of non-exporters is considerably higher among small rms with less than 20 employees,
and is much lower among large rms with 100 or more employees. The reverse is true for
the share of direct exporters. While it is only 22% among small rms, it is 48% and 70%
8 Similar surveys have been conducted elsewhere, in particular in a variety of Eastern European and
Central Asian countries. Compared to Turkey, however, sample sizes in these countries are very small
and hence the empirical results are less reliable. Instead of focusing on just one country, I could also pool
observations across countries. However, market conditions and export destinations dier across countries,
and a given level of productivity in a particular sector corresponds to dierent levels of employment or
sales in dierent countries. Hence, the relationship between rm size and the choice of export mode is
country specic and thus the addition of more countries to the sample is of little use.
9http://www.enterprisesurveys.org
10For details on the sectoral distribution of rms in the sample, see table 8 in the appendix.
10among medium sized and large rms, respectively. This nding is in line with what is now
considered a fact in the empirical literature on rms in international trade, namely that
in a cross-section of rms, exporters are generally larger than non-exporters.11 Similarly,
the share of indirect exporters rises from 19% to 37% when moving from the small to the
large rm category. Comparing the prevalence of dierent export modes across dierent
rm size categories suggests that as rms get larger, they shift from non-exporters to
indirect exporters, and further from indirect exporters to direct exporters. The relative
prevalence of rms which use an indirect export channel as opposed to rms which do
not export at all increases with rm size. However, the relative prevalence of rms which
use a trade intermediary as opposed to rms which export only directly declines as rms
get larger.
Summary statistics of the main variables of interest for the 421 rms which export
either indirectly or directly or both are given in table 2. All information refers to the
scal year 2007. Since the survey was answered by business owners and top managers,
sometimes in cooperation with company accountants and human resource managers, I
expect the information to be reasonably accurate. Respondents were asked to indicate the
rm's total annual sales in local currency and to report the percentage of total annual sales
that were national sales, indirect exports, which were specied as goods sold domestically
to a third party that exports them, and direct exports. With this information I can
construct the measure Si. The share of indirect exports in total exports is 0.331 on
average and varies considerably across exporters. Firm size as the main explanatory
variable is measured by the number of full time employees. The distribution of rm size
is skewed to the right, with a mean of 192 and a median of 73 employees.12
Table 2: Summary statistics
Variable Mean (Std. Dev.) Min. Max. N
Si 0.331 (0.411) 0 1 421
Firm size 191.729 (388.515) 2 4263 421
Firm age 18.076 (11.931) 0 82 421
Experience 23.798 (12.343) 1 70 421
Multiplant 0.112 (0.315) 0 1 421
Share university 0.14 (0.163) 0 0.9 421
Share nonproduction 0.254 (0.175) 0 0.842 421
R&D 0.352 (0.478) 0 1 421
New product 0.518 (0.5) 0 1 421
Courts 1.081 (1.29) 0 4 421
11See for instance Bernard and Jensen (1995) or Bernard et al. (2007).
12The key results are insensitive to alternative measures of rm size such as total annual sales or total
export sales.
11In addition to rm size, a variety of other rm characteristics may have an impact
on the export behavior and need to be taken into account in the empirical analysis in
order to avoid that their eect on the share of indirect exports in total exports is wrongly
assigned to the eect of rm size.13 Firm age indicates the years that have passed since
the establishment began its operations and thus captures whether the rm is new to
the market, while experience describes the years the top manager has worked in the
respective sector. Multiplant is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the rm is part of a
larger company. If this is the case, however, all information given in the survey refers
to the rm, and not to the larger company. Share university indicates the fraction of
employees that have a university degree and hence is a measure for skill intensity, while
share nonproduction indicates the fraction of employees that do not work in production,
but in areas such as management, administration, sales, or research and development.
Both R&D and new product are dummy variables that equal 1 if the rm invested in
research and development in 2007 or introduced a new product in the past three years,
respectively. These variables re
ect rm innovativeness. The variable courts indicates
whether rms perceive courts to be an obstacle to their current operations. Answers are
integers ranging from 0 (no obstacle) to 4 (very severe obstacle). Courts is used as a
proxy for the enforceability of contracts.
Table 3: Share of indirect exports in total exports and rm size
Firm size measured by employees
< 20 20   100  100
Indirect exports/total exports (Si) 0.45 0.33 0.29
Sorting exporters into dierent size categories as in table 1 and looking at the average
share of indirect exports in total exports sheds rst light on the relative importance of
intermediated as opposed to direct trade. It seems that indirect exports are indeed less
important for larger rms. However, to gain deeper insight into the determinants of the
choice of export mode, I will now turn to a multivariate analysis.
5 Empirical results
To assess the correlation between rm size and the relative importance of intermediated
exports, I will rst estimate equations of the form
Si = 0 + 1 ln(rm sizei) + 2Xi + i (14)
13For an overview of the variables that are commonly used to explain the export behavior of rms see
Bernard and Jensen (2004), Wagner (2001), and Fryges (2007), for instance.
12where Si is the share of indirect exports in total exports of rm i, Xi is a vector of control
variables, and i is an error term. Nearly all estimations include sector and region dum-
mies.14 The econometric method used is ordinary least squares with heteroskedasticity
robust standard errors.15 Results are presented in columns (1) to (4) of table 4.
Table 4: Eect of rm size on Si
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS OLS OLS OLS QMLE
Ln(rm size) -0.033** -0.050*** -0.060*** -0.063***
(0.015) (0.016) (0.018) (0.019)
Firm age -0.003 -0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Experience 0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Multiplant 0.147** 0.194*** 0.217***
(0.067) (0.068) (0.073)
Share university 0.024 0.083 0.085
(0.125) (0.123) (0.133)
Share nonproduction -0.159 -0.269* -0.278*
(0.138) (0.139) (0.146)
R&D -0.025 -0.017 -0.016
(0.045) (0.043) (0.044)
New product -0.067 -0.066 -0.068
(0.046) (0.045) (0.046)
Courts 0.029* 0.025 0.026
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
Sector dummies no yes yes yes yes
Region dummies no no yes yes yes
N 421 421 421 421 421
R2 0.011 0.051 0.089 0.115
Adjusted R2 0.009 0.014 0.027 0.052
Constant included
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01
Column (1) shows the estimated coecient of log rm size from a naive regression
without further control variables. It is negative and signicant, which is consistent with
the hypothesis that larger rms have a lower share of indirect exports in total exports.
Including sector dummies to control for sectoral dierences in the size distribution of
rms in column (2) strengthens this result. However, holding the sector xed, rm
14For the purpose of the survey, Turkish provinces have been aggregated into ve regions, which are
Marmara, Aegean, Black Sea and Eastern Turkey, Central Anatolia, and South Turkey.
15A Breusch-Pagan test rejects the hypotheses of constant variance.
13size is correlated with a set of other rm characteristics which may aect the relative
importance of indirect exports. For instance, larger rms are more likely to be part of
a larger company, and they have a lower share of nonproduction employees, re
ecting
economies of scale in headquarter services.16 Including such rm characteristics, but
omitting rm size in column (3) shows that being part of a larger company is associated
with a signicantly higher share of indirect exports in total exports. A rm's degree of
innovation as measured by the variables share nonproduction, R&D and new product, on
the contrary, has a negative impact on the relative prevalence of intermediated exports.
Hence, controlling for these additional rm characteristics is important to estimate the
true relationship between rm size and the share of indirect exports in total exports.
In fact, as reported in column (4), the negative relationship between rm size and the
relative importance of intermediated exports is reinforced once other rm characteristics
are controlled for. The estimated coecient of log rm size falls to -0.060 and gets highly
signicant. It implies that for the smallest rm with only two employees, one more worker
is associated with a decline in the share of indirect exports in total exports by about -0.03.
The sign and the size of the coecient of log rm size are very robust to the inclusion
of further rm characteristics, such as the legal status of the rm or the share of the
rm that is owned by foreign investors. Since these control variables turned out to be
insignicant, however, I omitted them from the set of regressors.17
As pointed out in the introduction, I cannot control for the number of destination
countries, nor for the characteristics of specic foreign markets. Part of this eect may
be captured by the sector dummies, which indicate the comparative advantage of an
industry compared to potential trading partners, and by the region dummies, which
re
ect the proximity of the rm to a specic destination country. Nevertheless, if larger
rms use a trade intermediary to export to less accessible countries which are not served by
smaller rms, the estimated coecient is a rather conservative indicator for the negative
relationship between rm size and the share of indirect exports in total exports to a
given destination country. In other words, if I could run a separate regression for each
destination country, I would presumably nd a coecient of rm size that is much larger
in absolute terms.
Neither rm age nor the experience of the manager seem to play an important role for
the choice of export mode. This might not be surprising, as both are very crude proxies
for the experience of a manufacturer in a given destination country. As an alternative
measure for foreign experience I used the years that have passed since the rm rst
exported. However, this variable is available only for a small subset of exporters. It
16The correlation coecient is 0.192 for rm size and multiplant, and -0.176 for rm size and share
nonproduction.
17See table 9 in the appendix for the results of these alternative specications.
14turned out to have no signicant eect on the share of indirect exports in total exports,
neither did it change the coecient of log rm size.
Being part of a larger company, as indicated by the multiplant variable, has a signi-
cantly positive eect on exporting indirectly as opposed to exporting directly. A potential
explanation is that rms which are part of a larger company mainly sell intermediate in-
puts and unnished goods to related rms, but ship relatively less products directly to
nal consumers.
The fraction of employees that have a university degree per se does not seem to play
an important role for the choice of export mode, although part of the eect of a high
skilled labor force might be captured by the fraction of employees that work in areas
other than production. Investing research and development and launching new products
enter with the expected sign but turn out to be insignicant at conventional levels.
The variable courts which is supposed to capture the legal environment and the en-
forceability of contracts does not have the expected sign, nor is it signicant. Firms were
asked not only whether they perceive courts as an obstacle to their operations, but also
whether they perceive the legal system as fair, impartial and uncorrupted, whether they
think that the court system is quick, and whether they believe that the court system is
able to enforce its decisions. None of these alternative measures had a signicant impact
on the share of intermediated exports in total exports. This may be due to the fact that
these measures are highly subjective, and potentially endogenous to the choice of export
mode. That is, a rm that frequently contracts with a trade intermediary is more likely
to end up in a dispute, and may then perceive dealing with courts as a hindrance to its
current operations. In addition, agreements between the exporter and the intermediary
may be subject to the legal system in the importing country, in which case courts would
not have any informative value for the actual enforceability of contracts.
Some researchers have raised concerns about using ordinary least squares regressions
if the dependent variable is a proportion that, by denition, can only take values from
0 to 1. Wagner (2001) has argued that this problem may be especially severe if there
are many limit observations, as in the case of the export to sales ratio, but also in
the present case where the dependent variable is indirect exports over total exports.
Basically, because the dependent variable is bounded between 0 and 1, the eect of
any explanatory variable cannot be constant throughout its range. Including non-linear
functions of the explanatory variable such as log rm size partly alleviates the problem,
however, the predicted values from an ordinary least squares regression can never be
guaranteed to lie in the interval [0;1]. Papke and Wooldridge (1996) suggest a non-linear
quasi-maximum likelihood estimator (QMLE) that yields consistent and asymptotically
normal distributed estimates regardless of the distribution of the dependent variable
15conditional on the controls, and that leads to predicted values between 0 and 1. The
results from applying the fractional response model to the relationship between rm size
and the relative importance of indirect exports are presented in column (5) of table
4. Note that the reported numbers are marginal eects evaluated at the mean.18 The
marginal eects depend on the specic likelihood function and therefore dier from the
estimated coecients.
When evaluated at the mean, the marginal eect of log rm size on the share of
indirect exports in total exports is -0.063 and thus very similar to the marginal eect
obtained from an ordinary least squares regression. The marginal eect of log rm size
is somewhat stronger when evaluated at the 10th percentile (-0.073) and slightly weaker
when evaluated at the 90th percentile (-0.049), which re
ects the non-linear relationship
between rm size and the choice of export mode. However, it is always negative and
signicant at the 1% level. The sign and the signicance of the marginal eects of other
explanatory variables do not change much either, indicating that the results are insensitive
to the econometric method used.
6 Robustness checks
In this section, I will perform a number of robustness checks to further strengthen the
previous ndings. I will use dierent functional forms. In addition, I will explore al-
ternative measures of rm size. And nally, I will use the status of being an indirect
versus a direct exporter as a binary dependent variable to show that the assumption of
a continuous share of indirect in total exports does not drive the results.
The results for dierent functional forms of rm size are given in table 5. The coef-
cient on rm size remains negative and signicant at the 5% level even if it does not
enter in logs, as shown in column (1). Sorting rms into dierent size categories accord-
ing to the number of full-time employees and regressing the share of indirect exports in
total exports on rms size dummies in column (2) reveals that both medium and large
rms drive the result. Compared to small rms, the share of indirect in total exports is
about -0.167 lower for medium sized rms and about -0.254 lower for large rms. The
coecients for medium sized and large rms are both highly signicant and dier at the
10% level.
Taking the log of rm size, but using the number of full-time employees in 2004 rather
than 2007 gives the results shown in column (1) of table 6. The coecient on lagged rm
size is negative, signicant, and only slightly smaller than the coecient on contemporary
18In case the explanatory variable is a dummy, the reported number is the eect of a discrete change
of the explanatory variable from 0 to 1.





Firm size 20-99 -0.167**
(0.065)
Firm size 100 -0.254***
(0.070)






Share university 0.035 0.100
(0.125) (0.124)










Adjusted R2 0.032 0.056
Constant, region and sector dummies included
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01
17rm size. This suggests that causality does in fact run from rm size to the relative
prevalence of intermediated trade, unless rms anticipate their export activities already
three years in advance and adopt their production and sales capacities accordingly. The
nding is also consistent with other results from the empirical trade literature which show
that high productivity precedes entry into export markets, substantiating the theory of
xed entry costs.19
A potential concern might be that all these results are sensitive to using the number
of full-time employees as a measure of rm size. This is however not the case. As shown
in columns (2) and (3) of table 6, using the log of total sales or the log of total export
sales as alternative measures of rm size yields very similar results, that is larger rms
make relatively less use of trade intermediaries.20
Given that I cannot regress the share of indirect in total exports on rm size for each
destination country separately it seems natural to treat Si as a continuous variable. In
fact, table 1 reveals that if exports are aggregated across all destination countries, nearly
a third of all exporters uses both export modes simultaneously and hence has Si 2 (0;1).
Nevertheless, as a further robustness check, I consider the choice of export mode as a
binary variable and estimate the eect of rm size on the probability of being an indirect
exporter as opposed to being a direct exporter. I dene a rm to be an indirect exporter
as soon as the share of indirect in total export sales is larger than zero. Hence, a rm
counts as a direct exporter only if Si = 0.21 The estimated marginal eects, evaluated
at the mean, are shown in table 7.22 They indicate a signicantly negative relationship
between rm size and the probability of being an indirect exporter as opposed to being
a direct exporter, and are thus perfectly in line with the previous ndings.
Finally, to check whether outliers drive the result, I excluded the largest and the
smallest rms from the sample (top and bottom 5 %). I also excluded sectors with only a
few observations, and I used 4-digit industry dummies instead of 2-digit sector dummies.
None of this aects the key result, namely that rm size has a negative and signicant
eect on the share of intermediated trade.23
19See Clerides et al. (1998), Bernard and Jensen (1999), or Aw et al. (2000), just to give a few examples.
20Unfortunately, total annual sales or total export sales are not available for all rms in the sample.
As these rms do however report an estimate of the percentage of their total annual sales that were due
to indirect and direct exports, I decided to keep them in the sample when using the number of full-time
employees as a measure of rm size. Excluding rms with missing sales date has however no signicant
eect on the results.
21Alternatively, I could dene a rm as an indirect exporter if it makes more than 50 % or all of its
export sales via a trade intermediary. This changes the estimated marginal eects slightly, but does not
invalidate the main conclusions. Results are available upon request.
22Again, in case the explanatory variable is a dummy, the reported number is the eect of a discrete
change of the explanatory variable from the base level.
23Results are available upon request.
18Table 6: Eect of rm size on Si for alternative measures of rms size
(1) (2) (3)
OLS OLS OLS






Firm age 0.000 -0.002 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Experience 0.001 -0.000 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Multiplant 0.135* 0.199*** 0.203***
(0.072) (0.073) (0.072)
Share university 0.104 0.029 0.066
(0.138) (0.130) (0.130)
Share nonproduction -0.298* -0.082 -0.084
(0.152) (0.150) (0.151)
R&D -0.031 -0.006 -0.030
(0.048) (0.047) (0.048)
New product -0.084 -0.072 -0.050
(0.051) (0.049) (0.049)
Courts 0.025 0.017 0.016
(0.019) (0.018) (0.018)
N 355 365 357
R2 0.113 0.134 0.119
Adjusted R2 0.040 0.062 0.044
Constant, region and sector dummies included
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01





Firm size 20-99 -0.153**
(0.076)
Firm size 100 -0.247***
(0.083)






Share university 0.085 0.108
(0.181) (0.181)









Constant, region and sector dummies included
Robust standard errors in parentheses
p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01
207 Conclusion
Although trade intermediation is a phenomenon well established in reality, it has only
recently been addressed in the international trade literature. While many contributions
focus on the nature of trade intermediaries, little is known about the manufacturers that
actually ship their goods indirectly. Recent theoretical research suggests that the choice
of export mode depends, among other factors, on the size and the productivity of a
rm. Since intermediated exports are associated with lower xed costs of gaining access
to foreign markets, they are an attractive option for small and rather inecient rms
which want to export their goods. Building an own distribution network and maintaining
customer relations abroad is much more costly, and only pays for large manufacturers
which are protable enough to cover the higher xed costs.
The present paper brings this hypothesis to a test. Using data from the World Bank
Enterprise Survey conducted in Turkey in 2008, it shows that there is indeed a signicant
negative correlation between rm size and the relative importance of indirect exports as
opposed to direct exports. This relationship is robust to the inclusion of a variety of
controls, dierent estimation methods, and dierent measures of rm size.
One drawback of the data used is that is does not contain any information on the
number and the features of the destination countries a rm serves. This seems to be a
more general problem in the empirical international trade literature. Transaction based
data sets as provided by customs authorities have information on destination countries,
however they rarely provide details on the rms involved in intermediated trade. Rich
information about rm characteristics from the analysis of balance sheet data or survey
data does however rarely comprise details about rms' export destinations. Combin-
ing both destination country and rm characteristics in a large sample seems to be a
promising avenue for further research on the role of indirect exports for dierent manu-
facturers. Another way to improve upon the existing evidence is to use rigorous measures
of rm productivity estimated from panel data instead of proxies for rm size such as
employment or sales.
From a theoretical perspective, modeling a trade intermediation sector instead of
simply assuming a specic intermediation technology would be the next step. First
attempts in this direction have been made by Antr as and Costinot (2011) and Antr as
and Costinot (2010).
21Appendix
Appendix A: Sectoral composition of rms
Manufacturing rms are classied into industries as dened in Rev. 3.1 of the International
Standard Classication Code according to their main product.
Table 8: Sectoral composition of rms
Industry (ISIC) Number of rms Share in %
Food and beverages (15) 134 19.03
Textiles (17) 157 22.30
Apparel (18) 86 12.22
Leather (19) 3 0.43
Wood (20) 2 0.28
Paper (21) 2 0.28
Publishing (22) 1 0.14
Coke and fuel (23) 2 0.28
Chemicals (24) 91 12.93
Rubber and plastics (25) 29 4.12
Non-metallic minerals (26) 91 12.93
Basic metals (27) 11 1.56
Fabricated metals (28) 35 4.97
Machinery (29) 35 4.97
Electrical appliances (31) 5 0.71
Communication equipment (32) 4 0.57
Motor vehicles (34) 10 1.42
Furniture (36) 6 0.85
Total 704 100.00
Appendix B: Additional control variables
Including additional controls for the legal status of a rm and the percentage of a rm
owned by foreign investors gives the results presented in columns (1) and (2) of table 9.
22Table 9: Eect of rm size on Si with additional controls
(1) (2)
Ln(rm size) -0.059*** -0.061***
(0.018) (0.018)






Share university 0.051 0.088
(0.126) (0.125)










Legal status dummy yes no
N 421 418
R2 0.128 0.120
Adjusted R2 0.053 0.054
Constant, region and sector dummies included
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01
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